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FOREWORD
The U.S. Army performs a number of critical missions across the vast Indo-Asia-Pacific region. These
include underwriting deterrence, building coalition
capability, strengthening institutional capacity among
partner defense establishments, maintaining interoperability, promoting military professionalism, building operational access, and conducting humanitarian
assistance missions. For many, it may come as a surprise to know that almost all of the many Army activities and events that support these missions outside of
Northeast Asia are conducted with U.S. Army forces
based in the 50 states, often Alaska and Washington
State. The roughly 22,000 U.S. Army Soldiers based
in South Korea and Japan are focused largely on deterring North Korea from large-scale aggression, and
assuring South Korea and other countries of the steadfastness of Washington’s alliance commitment.
The costs associated with supporting the increasingly important array of Army military-to-military
activities across the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater with
forces based in the 50 states present the Army with a
significant dilemma—namely, trying to play its vital
role in America’s broad strategy toward the theater
while conducting a post-war drawdown in an era of
constrained fiscal resources. In this monograph, Dr.
John R. Deni describes, analyzes, and explains the potential benefits and risks associated with a potential
solution to that broad dilemma—a reconfigured Army
presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. According
to Dr. Deni, the time has come for the U.S. Army to
reexamine long-held assumptions and move beyond
outmoded paradigms, in part by adjusting the Army’s
presence in East Asia. In this companion study to his
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recent monograph examining the future of the Army
presence in Europe, Dr. Deni provides evidence to
support his conclusion that a reconfigured Army forward presence in the Pacific theater could increase the
effectiveness of Army efforts, while also providing efficiency gains over time. In doing so, Dr. Deni makes
an important contribution to the debate over the future
role, mission, and structure of the Army in the IndoAsia-Pacific theater and to the manner in which strategic Landpower supports broad U.S. national security
goals. For this reason, the Strategic Studies Institute is
pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to
the ongoing national discussion on the role of the U.S.
Army and the manner in which it can best serve the
Nation today and in the future.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press

vi

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
JOHN R. DENI joined the Strategic Studies Institute
in November 2011 as a Research Professor of Joint,
Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational
Security Studies. He previously worked for 8 years as
a political advisor for senior U.S. military commanders in Europe. Prior to that, he spent 2 years as a strategic planner specializing in the military-to-military relationship between the United States and its European
allies. While working for the U.S. military in Europe,
Dr. Deni was also an adjunct lecturer at Heidelberg
University’s Institute for Political Science. There, he
taught graduate and undergraduate courses on U.S.
foreign and security policy, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), European security, and alliance theory and practice. Before working in Germany,
he spent 7 years in Washington, DC, as a consultant
specializing in national security issues for the U.S.
Departments of Defense, Energy, and State and has
spoken at conferences and symposia throughout Europe and North America. Dr. Deni recently authored
the book, Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century, as well as several journal articles. He has published op-eds in major newspapers such as the Los Angeles Times and the
Baltimore Sun. Dr. Deni completed his undergraduate
degree in history and international relations at the
College of William & Mary and holds an M.A. in U.S.
foreign policy at American University in Washington,
DC, and a Ph.D. in international affairs from George
Washington University.

vii

SUMMARY
The time has come for a reappraisal of the U.S.
Army’s forward presence in East Asia, given the significantly changed strategic context and the extraordinarily high, recurring costs of deploying U.S. Army
forces from the 50 states for increasingly important security cooperation activities across the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. For economic, political, diplomatic, and
military reasons, the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater continues to grow in importance to the United States. As
part of a broad, interagency, multifaceted approach,
the U.S. military plays a critical role in the rebalancing
effort now underway. The U.S. Army in particular has
a special role to play in bolstering the defense of allies
and the deterrence of aggression, promoting regional
security and stability, and ameliorating the growing
U.S.-China security dilemma.
In particular, military security cooperation programs are becoming increasingly important for achieving U.S. security goals. These military-to-military programs and activities are designed to shape the security
environment; prevent conflict through deterrence, assurance, and transparency; and build operational and
tactical interoperability. As wartime requirements
decrease in the coming year following the end of extensive American involvement in Afghanistan and as
the U.S. military undergoes a dramatic yet historically
typical post-war drawdown, security cooperation
activities will comprise the primary way in which a
leaner U.S. military contributes to broad American
national security objectives in the next decade.
However, the U.S. Army today remains hamstrung in its efforts to contribute to those broader security goals in the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. A dated
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basing paradigm limits the utility to be gained from
the roughly 22,000 U.S. Army Soldiers based in East
Asia, and the extraordinarily high transportation costs
associated with sending other U.S.-based Army forces
to conduct security cooperation activities across the
vast Indo-Asia-Pacific region limits what the Army
can accomplish. If reconfigured, the forward-based
Army presence in East Asia could help achieve U.S.
objectives more effectively and more efficiently. Effectiveness would be increased through more regular,
longer duration engagement with critical allies and
partners, including Australia, India, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, while
still maintaining deterrence through punishment on
the Korean Peninsula. Efficiency would grow by reducing the recurring transportation costs associated
with today’s practice of sending U.S.-based units to
conduct most exercises and training events across the
Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
Changing the U.S. Army’s forward posture in East
Asia involves overcoming several hurdles. These include the challenge of reassuring South Korea and Japan of the U.S. commitment to their security, even as
the number of U.S. Soldiers based in those countries
decreases; the difficulty of negotiating status of forces agreements and/or cost mitigation arrangements
with potential new host nations like Australia or the
Philippines; budgetary challenges in terms of funding any necessary initial infrastructure investments;
and the need to allay Chinese fears of containment
and encirclement. However, these challenges are not
necessarily insurmountable. For instance, countries
across the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater, including some
that have long viewed the United States with suspicion, are coming to value increasingly the offshore
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balancing role Washington can play vis-à-vis China.
Additionally, the one-time infrastructure investment
costs associated with any new U.S. forward presence
in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region are likely to be offset
over a matter of years by savings gained from reduced
transportation costs. Finally, Washington can work to
explain to Beijing how a transparently reconfigured
U.S. presence in East Asia actually benefits China by
acting as a pacifier for the more aggressive impulses of
American allies and partners in the region, and by reassuring leaders in those same countries that as China
rises, the United States will remain a steadfast partner.
There are no guarantees that the United States will
succeed in overcoming all of the potential difficulties
associated with a reconfigured Army presence in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific region, but to avoid trying would
severely limit the effectiveness and the efficiency of
the Army’s contribution to broader U.S. national
security goals.
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THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN LANDPOWER:
DOES FORWARD PRESENCE STILL MATTER?
THE CASE OF THE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC
Introduction.
With the January 2012 release of the Defense Strategic Guidance, the U.S. military has increased the attention it pays to the Pacific theater. Officially titled
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, what has come to be known as the Defense Strategic Guidance directed the U.S. military to
“rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.”1 Despite
being heralded by some as a dramatic “pivot,” some
data points indicate that Washington’s rebalancing is
actually part of an ongoing evolution versus a revolution in U.S. policy. For example, several changes to the
U.S. military posture in the Pacific—such as the U.S.
Marine Corps’ plan to relocate thousands of Marines
from Okinawa to Guam—have been underway for
some time.
Other changes have been far more recent though,
such as the effort on the part of the U.S. Marine Corps
to establish a rotational presence at an Australian
training facility in Darwin, and appear directly connected to the guidance issued in January 2012. In any
event, all of the U.S. military services have taken their
cue from the civilian political leadership in Washington, strengthening, initiating, and/or reinvigorating
efforts to engage allies, partners, and others throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
Among the military services, the U.S. Army has
been particularly active. This may come as a surprise
to outside observers, especially given the sense in the
United States that the Pacific theater, outside the con-
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text of the Korean Peninsula, is largely the purview of
the U.S. Navy and/or the Air Force. There is certainly
some logic to that perception, considering the vast distances involved in traversing the theater, which make
the mobility platform-intensive Navy and Air Force
perhaps better suited to engaging allies, partners, and
others throughout the region. In part, this perception has been reinforced by the services themselves,
as well as the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). For
instance, in its 55-year history, U.S. Pacific Command
(USPACOM), based in Hawaii, has never been led by
an Army four-star general.2
Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom that the
Indo-Asia-Pacific theater is solely or even mostly the
purview of the U.S. Navy or Air Force is somewhat
outdated. The Army has been and continues to be a
major player in the theater as well, judging from not
simply Army-led operations during the Korean and
Vietnam Wars or ongoing Army-led ballistic missile
defense operations in Japan and Guam, but especially
in the military-to-military activities undertaken by the
Army throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region over
the last several decades. These activities have proven
critical to building the land force capabilities of countries in South, Southeast, and East Asia and Oceania to
promote their own security against internal and external threats, to deal with the aftermath of humanitarian
disasters by building institutional capacity, to increase
professionalism and respect for civilian authorities
within partner militaries, to develop operational and
tactical interoperability for military operations ranging from peacekeeping to high intensity combat, to
further information sharing, to assure treaty allies,
and to achieve other shared objectives. For example,
the U.S. Army Pacific—based in Hawaii—conducts
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roughly 200 partnership and engagement activities
annually, including 26 major exercises to build partner capacity and maintain varying levels of partner
nation interoperability for bilateral and multilateral
coalition operations.
Some of the effects achieved by these partnership
and engagement activities, such as treaty ally assurance, can be accomplished by U.S. naval and air forces
as well. Other effects, such as building capacity to handle humanitarian response crises beyond the littoral,
are accomplished more effectively through Army-toArmy interaction and training. Moreover, land forces
in the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater have outsized influence in their respective defense establishments—21 of
27 major partners’ defense chiefs are Army officers.
Among the many tools the U.S. Army wields in
implementing its part of the broader USPACOM
theater strategy are those U.S. Army forces based
in Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington State—in total,
roughly 65,000 Active-Duty Soldiers—who frequently
engage allies, partners, and others throughout the
theater. This monograph will focus on the role of the
forward-based U.S. Army forces in the Indo-AsiaPacific region—that is, those outside the 50 states. Forward-based forces are a powerful tool in the pursuit of
both national military and national security goals for
several reasons:
•	They are a visible U.S. presence in East, South,
and Southeast Asia and Oceania;
•	They make tangible the many bilateral U.S. security commitments throughout the Indo-AsiaPacific region;
•	They help ensure operational and other forms
of access both where they are based and
beyond;
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•	They help promote interoperability with some
of America’s most capable military allies and
most likely coalition partners; and,
•	They help build capability among lesser able
states for both regional and local stability and
security.
However, as with the outdated notion of the Pacific theater as a Navy- or Air Force-only theater, the Army’s forward posture in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region
reflects a bygone era. In many respects, the forward
posture orientation of the Army today—centered on
South Korea and, to a lesser degree, Japan—remains
rooted in a rationale that has seen little wholesale reassessment since the end of the Cold War. The Army’s
presence in South Korea is based on the threat that
North Korea has posed in one form or another since
the end of the Korean War and on the U.S. concomitant treaty obligations to South Korea. The same is
largely true of the Army presence in Japan, which is
primarily oriented toward logistical support of forces
in South Korea but also grounded in a treaty commitment. If the Army’s posture in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
region were a blank slate today, it is not entirely clear
whether it would be in America’s interests to base its
forces as they currently are. Certainly American treaty
commitments to Japan and South Korea remain as
vital today as they were 60 years ago. But given the
changing strategic context and the role of the Army
in fulfilling American strategy—subjects this monograph will examine further—it is conceivable that the
existing Army posture is not as effective or as efficient
as it might be and is instead a victim of inertia.
Changing that posture would not be easy politically, without up-front costs, or without risk. However,
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with the return of America’s soft power following the
low point of George W. Bush’s first term, and with rising regional anxiety over Beijing’s increasingly overt
ability and willingness to translate its economic power into political muscle, the time may be ripe for a reexamination and a reconceptualization of the Army’s
forward presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
This monograph is certainly not the first to address
the necessity of assessing and possibly reconceptualizing the U.S. military posture in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
region. For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies recently completed a study on the
subject of American forward presence in the Pacific
theater, the American Enterprise Institute published
a study on transforming the U.S. strategy in Asia that
counted modifications to U.S. forward presence among
its recommendations, and RAND published a report
on the strategic choices facing Washington in terms
of overseas presence.3 However, those efforts did not
address specifically or thoroughly the role played by
the U.S. Army in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, focusing largely on the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine
Corps. Older, similar strategies and proposals lacked
modern budget austerity contextualization.4 Hence, a
reassessment of the U.S. Army’s posture during an era
of austerity and budget sequestration seems necessary
and appropriate.
An analysis of the Army’s posture in the Pacific
theater must begin by first addressing the changed
strategic context, in order to discern the key factors
that justify a reexamination of how the Army’s forward presence might be wielded in fulfilling U.S.
strategy. Next, this monograph will assess the manner
in which the United States has responded to the evolving context, with key changes in its strategy, including
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emphasizing standoff capability, cutting the total size
of the military, and “rebalancing” toward the IndoAsia-Pacific region. One important manifestation of
that rebalancing is the role that the Army’s forwardbased forces have or could have in securing American
interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Finally, the
monograph will examine whether and how changes
in the Army’s forward posture may make those forces more effective and/or more efficient in achieving
American ends and furthering American interests.
Change and Continuity in the Strategic Context.
The international environment facing the United
States has changed significantly and in a variety of
ways over the last 10-15 years. Three aspects of the
current international security context are most salient
in Washington. First, and perhaps most obviously, the
United States now exists in an era of constrained fiscal
resources. Argue as some may over whether the Pentagon’s budget is bloated following over a decade of
war—and there is some evidence that parts of it are5—
the fact remains that DoD may have to implement
some of most significant across-the-board spending
cuts in recent memory.
The sequester agreement that was part of the 2011
debt ceiling deal is the most immediate budgetary
challenge facing the Department. The 2013 furlough
of civilian employees impacted virtually every DoD
function, from maintenance to training to strategic
analysis to intelligence assessment. What is perhaps
worse, though, from a national security perspective, is
the impact on readiness. In early-2013, former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta argued that:
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the Department of Defense is again facing what I believe and what the service chiefs believe and what
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe is the
most serious readiness crisis that this country is [going
to] confront in over a decade.6

In late-March 2013, the DoD announced it would
end training for all Army units except those preparing to deploy to Afghanistan. It also announced that
the Navy would stand down four wings—the equivalent of roughly 240 aircraft—and that the Air Force
would curtail training for nondeployed squadrons.7
Taken together, this adds up to a military that is not
as prepared as it should be to defend the interests and
security of the United States and its allies around the
world.8
In addition to readiness, current operations also
face restrictions. Already the Pentagon has announced
that it will only deploy one carrier strike force in the
Persian Gulf, vice two. In late-February 2013, the U.S.
Navy also announced it would cancel or defer six deployments.9 Sequestration may also prevent the Army
from deploying follow-on rotations to Afghanistan,
thereby prolonging the deployments of units already
in the field.10
Beyond the immediate challenges posed by sequestration, all indications are that the defense budget
is headed downward over the next decade. From the
peak of fiscal year (FY) 2010—when the defense budget was at its highest point in constant dollars since
World War II—the defense budget now faces steady
cuts for the foreseeable future. In previous drawdowns, such as those following the Korean War, the
Vietnam War, and the Cold War, defense spending
was cut an average of 33 percent in constant dollars.11
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The Barack Obama administration’s own projections
that accompanied the FY2014 budget submission bear
out a continuation of this trend, as shown in Figure
1.12 Regardless of whether one views that positively
or negatively from a normative perspective, the fact
is that American national security will face increased
risk. That risk may be completely acceptable and manageable, or it may not—much will depend on how the
United States wields strategy to mediate between risk
and cost.

Figure 1. U.S. Defense Spending
in Constant Millions of U.S. Dollars.
The second-most important aspect of the current
strategic context is a reluctance among senior U.S.
leaders to engage in any further land force-intensive
operations in Asia or to take on any national security
challenge that may require a major reconstruction effort. After a decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan,
this sense among senior policy- and decisionmakers
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reflects public opinion, which long ago began to turn
against both wars and, in some ways, reflects the return of the “Vietnam syndrome” of the late-1970s and
early-1980s.
Regardless of the argument that the wars and Iraq
and Afghanistan were chronically under-resourced,
it has become conventional wisdom in Washington,
DC, that large land wars, particularly in Asia but also
the Middle East or Africa, ought to be avoided.13 For
the national security community, and especially the
defense community, this preference among senior
decision- and policymakers was manifested through
the Defense Strategic Guidance published in January
2012. That document made it clear that the ActiveDuty U.S. military force should be, “able to secure
territory and populations and facilitate a transition to
stable governance on a small scale for a limited period.”14 Not surprisingly, the military services have
adjusted accordingly, particularly as they each engage
in planning for the post-International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) drawdown of military forces. For
example, the Army has eliminated large-scale stability
operations as one of the many criteria used to size and
structure itself.
Despite the fact that eschewing major counterinsurgency and/or reconstruction efforts overseas,
especially in Asia, may be good politics, it is unclear
to many in the epistemic community whether it is a
realistic policy.15 Many of those experts are far less
sanguine regarding the U.S. ability to pick its enemies
and its fights effectively, thereby limiting the conflicts
America gets involved in to just those that Washington prefers.16 Events in Syria over the last 3 years—
and the U.S. reluctance to become involved in any
extensive way—exemplify the challenges Washington
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will continue to face in trying to balance the pursuit
of its interests against the recent baggage of Iraq and
Afghanistan, at least until a new administration takes
office in January 2017 and perhaps longer.
More specifically, even as the United States ends
large-scale involvement on the ground in Iraq and
Afghanistan, maritime-based tensions continue to rise
in various locales across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
While it may be expedient and perhaps accurate to
assume that the U.S. Navy would play the lead role
at least initially in any American involvement in such
a conflict, it is equally certain that as days give way
to weeks and months, the United States may be compelled to commit ground forces. Theater and point air
and ballistic missile defense, security force assistance,
ground surveillance, cyber and network security, and
theater sustainment and logistical support are just
some of the extensive Army capabilities—in many
cases, already in theater—that might be reasonably
called upon in the event of a maritime dispute that
lasts longer than several days.
Third, there is a growing perception that Asia is increasing in importance when it comes to regions of the
world vital to the U.S. economy and hence the American way of life. For example, Asian economies clearly
are growing at a faster rate than those elsewhere in the
world, even with the recent economic slowdown.17
In terms of trade, the picture is somewhat more
mixed, at least at first glance. For instance, in 2012,
the top 15 U.S. trading partners (imports and exports
combined) were Canada, China, Mexico, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), South Korea, Brazil,
Saudi Arabia, France, Taiwan, the Netherlands, India,
Venezuela, and Italy.18 From a regional perspective,
and excluding contiguous neighbors, five of these
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countries are in East or South Asia, and five are in
Europe—a relatively even split. In 2006, by contrast,
six were from East or South Asia, and five were from
Europe. In 2001, six were from East or South Asia, and
six were from Europe.19 Finally, in 1990, six were from
East or South Asia, and six were from Europe.20 Considered together, this hardly paints a picture of East
and South Asia gradually, yet methodically, displacing Europe in terms of importance in trade relations.
A closer examination of the volume of trade reveals that Asia is growing in importance to the U.S.
economy. In 2001, the dollar value of U.S. trade with
the six East or South Asian countries in the top 15 was
just over one and a half times that of trade with the top
European countries; in 2006, the value of trade with
Asia was nearly twice that of trade with Europe; and
in 2012, the value of trade with Asia was more than
twice that of trade with Europe.
More specifically, there is also significant evidence
that the Indian Ocean has grown in relative importance in terms of global trade.21 Given the volume of
world trade that passes through it each day, the Indian Ocean has become arguably, “the world’s most
important energy and international trade maritime
route.”22 In Australia, Washington’s closest ally in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific, leaders in Canberra, Australia, see
the Indian Ocean as a region of greater importance
than even the Pacific or Atlantic Oceans:
Driven by Asia’s economic rise, the Indian Ocean is
surpassing the Atlantic and Pacific as the world’s busiest and most strategically significant trade corridor.
One-third of the world’s bulk cargo and around twothirds of world oil shipments now pass through the
Indian Ocean.23
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China recognizes the growing importance of the
Indian Ocean as well, which explains in part its reported search for a series of friendly ports to potentially extend its influence in the region, and its efforts
to develop pipelines across Southeast Asia for growing energy demand in southwest China.24 These and
other data points and analyses from both private and
public sources appear to support the notion that there
is a steady if gradual shift in relative wealth and economic power toward East and South Asia that is likely
to endure.25
In summary, the United States confronts a strategic context in which resources for national security
will remain significantly constrained. With fewer resources at hand, there will be even greater emphasis
on preventing conflict and shaping regional and global security environments as efficiently as possible, all
in an effort to keep major conflicts and/or massive
reconstruction and stability operations at bay. At the
same time, the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific-Asia region will compel the United States to reallocate resources from other areas or within the region to
make the most efficient use of limited tools in shaping
and preventing.
Shifting the Strategy.
Given these and other changes in the strategic context that the United States finds itself in, Washington
has responded by shifting its military strategy in a variety of ways. First, it has begun to emphasize standoff
military capability. This has been exemplified by the
new Air-Sea Battle concept and the increased role of
drones in U.S. military operations. Additionally, the
United States has shown itself increasingly willing
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to employ—in the right circumstances—an approach
that some critics of the Obama administration have
derided as “leading from behind.” This model—exemplified by U.S. actions in support of several North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies involved
in the Libyan civil war of 2011—seems a prudent use
of American forces and assets, applicable to certain
situations where the interests of U.S. allies are vital
and American interests are less so.
Second, DoD has begun a significant drawdown
of military personnel.26 From a wartime high of over
560,000 Active-Duty Soldiers, the Army will reduce
its end strength to below 490,000 over the next several years. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps is planning
on dropping from roughly 205,000 Active-Duty Marines to roughly 182,000. Some argue the cuts should
be even deeper.27 In any case, military leaders hope
end strength cuts will result in significant budgetary
savings and allow them to protect training and modernization funds.28 At the same time, military leaders
also argue that even though U.S. forces may decline
to roughly pre-September 11, 2001 (9/11) levels, the
capabilities of tomorrow’s military will be far greater
than that of the 1990s, given the combat experience of
the last decade.29
Third, Washington has begun reemphasizing the
importance of Asia in its foreign and defense policies.
For the DoD, this was most dramatically and most recently expressed in the January 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance mentioned earlier. Since that time, many
have interpreted America’s “pivot to the Pacific” as
a means of containing China with a ring of military
alignments, similar in some ways to how the United
States sought to contain the Soviet Union through an
array of security alliances and agreements—NATO,
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the Central Treaty Organization, and the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization, for example.30
However, U.S. policymakers and senior leaders
have gone to great lengths to downplay the role of any
containment element in Washington’s rebalancing
strategy. “Our new strategy and rebalancing in Asia is
. . . not about containing China,” said General Martin
Dempsey, the senior U.S. military officer.31 More recently, Secretary of State John Kerry appeared to back
away from the concept slightly, at least in its military
manifestations: “I’m not convinced that increased military ramp-up [in the Asia-Pacific] is critical yet. . . .
That’s something I’d want to look at very carefully.”32
Just 2 weeks later, former U.S. National Security Advisor Jim Jones characterized the phrase “pivot to Asia”
as, “the words we regret most.”33
Regardless, the “pivot,” or rather the rebalancing,
is not entirely a new phenomenon. It reflects an evolutionary change—not a revolutionary one—that has
been underway for 2 decades as the United States devotes increasing attention to matters in East and South
Asia and focuses less on the more limited security
challenges in Europe and Latin America. Nonetheless,
the Army has responded with additional measures
since January 2012, beyond those that have been underway over the last 20 years. For example, the Army
has removed the 25th Infantry Division, based in Hawaii, from the pool of forces available for worldwide
deployment, which should enable the division to focus more on engaging partner militaries in the Pacific
theater. Additionally, the Army has elevated the rank
of the USPACOM commander, who is based in Hawaii, from a three-star general officer to a four-star
general officer.
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Another important element of America’s evolving
policy toward the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater is the U.S.
forward military presence. Whether the United States
is rebalancing to engage China or to confront it—
among other objectives forward-based military forces
can help to achieve—forward presence of U.S. forces
plays a vital role. For example, forward presence could
be used to contain China through both an intensification of existing bilateral security agreements between
the United States and key partners and allies or the
initiation of similar arrangements with new partners
in the region. Alternatively, forward presence could
also be used to engage China bilaterally and multilaterally, seeking to build confidence through transparency and the development of mutual understanding
much in the way the United States used confidence
and security-building measures of the 1980s and 1990s
with the former Soviet Union.34 Actually a third option exists as well—that forward presence could be
used simultaneously to achieve both of these objectives through a sort of “two-track” approach involving both carrots and sticks.
Because forward presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
region plays such an important role, it too has been
subject to reexamination within the DoD in recent
months and years. The unfolding results of this reexamination have included some changes in the U.S.
force posture in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. To a limited degree, these changes have entailed adding more
to what is already a robust presence in the theater. For
example, the recently concluded basing agreement
with the Philippines to make use of facilities at Subic
Bay and Clark Air Base will provide the U.S. military
with an additional location to operate from, as well as
a means to engage more actively the Filipino military
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and develop its capacity to promote security and stability in the region.
In other cases, the changes to posture entail shifting assets from others theaters to the Indo-Asia-Pacific
region. For example, the U.S. Navy will shift its fleet
presence from the current 50-50 split between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, to a roughly 60-40 split
favoring the Pacific. The U.S. Navy will also deploy
rotationally between two and four littoral combat
ships to Singapore.
Similarly, even though the U.S. Marine Corps is
reducing end strength overall, it is shifting more of its
remaining resources to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
In 2012, it conducted the first of what are likely to become increasingly larger annual training rotation deployments to Darwin, Australia, through 2016.35 The
first two rotations in 2012 and 2013 included between
200 and 250 Marines, while the 2014 rotation is slated
to consist of 1,150 Marines. Eventually, the Marine
Corps reportedly plans to send up to 2,500 Marines,
as well as fixed and rotary wing aircraft.36 Elsewhere
in Australia, the U.S. Air Force may make greater use
of Australian Air Force bases, and the U.S. Navy may
conduct more port calls on an Australian naval base
outside of Perth.37
Meanwhile, the Army presence in the Western
Pacific remains seemingly a captive of inertia based
on a Cold War paradigm, with Army forces in the region still concentrated in South Korea and, to a lesser
degree, Japan. Given strategic and regional dynamics
during the Cold War, it made sense to base U.S. Army
forces in these locations—after all, the contingency that
would most likely require the application of American Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region was a
North Korean invasion of the South. From a practical
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perspective, there were few other countries interested
in permanently hosting U.S. forces in the region.
However, having so many U.S. Army forces tied
to missions supporting security and stability on the
Korean Peninsula has meant that the Army has had
to look elsewhere to source the increasingly important “shaping” and “preventing” activities across the
region. It is likely that missions to shape the security
environment and prevent conflict will comprise the
majority of the U.S. military’s post-ISAF activities in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater over the next decade.
Unfortunately, for the U.S. Army to provide personnel and equipment for those missions from locations
other than South Korea or Japan is neither an efficient
nor effective use of limited resources. For instance, the
cost of transporting personnel from Hawaii, Washington State, or Alaska to exercises and training events in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific region is extraordinarily expensive, certainly more so than sending personnel from
South Korea or Japan, even though that is not an option in most instances today. By one estimate, to send
a Stryker battalion’s worth of personnel plus a company’s worth of their equipment from Washington State
or Alaska to the Philippines for an exercise or training
event costs roughly double—somewhere between $3
million and $5 million, depending on the amount of
advance notice possible—what it would cost to send
the same from South Korea.38 Transportation costs
consume so much of U.S. Army Pacific’s available
security cooperation budget that they are unable to
send Stryker Brigade Combat Teams into the IndoAsia-Pacific region for exercises or training in any significantly meaningful way. Certainly entire brigade
combat teams are not necessary for many, if not most,
of the security cooperation activities conducted by
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U.S. Army Forces, US Pacific Command (USARPAC)
around the theater, but especially in cases where advanced operational and tactical interoperability across
the range of military operations with America’s closest treaty allies is the objective, this necessarily limits
the ability of the U.S. Army to contribute to overall
American security objectives.
From one perspective, a U.S. Army posture focused on South Korea and Japan may appear to still
make sense, considering recent North Korean saber rattling as well as Pyongyang’s renunciation of
the 1953 armistice agreement that essentially ended
the Korean War.39 However, given the significantly
changed strategic context outlined previously and
the extraordinarily high, recurring costs of deploying
U.S. Army forces from the 50 states for security cooperation activities around the theater, it may be time to
reexamine the basis for the Army’s presence in East
Asia. As argued later in this monograph, the United
States may need to consider recasting that presence
if it might help to achieve U.S. objectives more effectively and more efficiently without gravely undermining the American commitment to the defense of South
Korea and Japan or dramatically worsening relations
with China.
The Challenges of Adjusting U.S. Overseas Posture.
Certainly changing that presence may not be politically easy, inexpensive, or risk-free. For example, creating forward presence where one does not yet exist
is a process usually accompanied by intense, lengthy
political negotiations with prospective host nations.
However, there is evidence that implies countries of
the Indo-Asia-Pacific region may be more amenable

18

to some U.S. military presence today than they have
been in some time, even if only rotational in nature.
This is because the U.S. ability to be viewed as the security partner of first resort has not been as great as it
is today since the opening days of the Cold War, when
perceptions of an ideologically and militarily aggressive Soviet Union pushed many in Europe, Asia, and
elsewhere—particularly those not occupied by Soviet
forces—to seek alignment with America.40
Witness, for example, the apparently complete
turnaround in attitudes within the Philippines. In the
immediate aftermath of the Cold War, political leaders in Manila essentially ejected the United States
from military facilities at Subic Bay and Clark Air
Base, which were among the largest overseas American bases worldwide. Today however, officials in the
Philippines are actively pursuing an American military presence, largely as a means of hedging against
growing Chinese influence in the South China Sea,
also known as the West Philippine Sea. More specifically, the Chinese government has sent warships to escort large flotillas of fishing boats into the South China
Sea to strengthen its claims within the area it has identified by the so-called “nine-dash line,” as depicted in
Figure 2.41 Beijing has also accused the Philippines of
“illegal occupation” of some of the Spratly Islands.42
Unable to counter Chinese military power alone and
therefore interested in relying on the United States
as an off-shore balancer, the Philippines has pursued closer military relations with the United States
through basing agreements and an increased program
of exercises and training events.43
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Source: The Perry-Castañeda Library Collection, Austin, TX:
University of Texas at Austin.

Figure 2. South China Sea,
with the so-called “Nine-Dash Line.”
In fact, Manilla is not alone in pursuing such policies. Chinese actions in the South China Sea—as well
as historical animosity between the Vietnamese and
Chinese—have also been used to explain Vietnam’s
rapprochement with the United States in recent years.44
Although reactions to China’s growing ambition are
not uniform across the region, the combination of domestic politics, changes in the power dynamics of the
international system, and historical baggage together
have led countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam,
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Malaysia, and Indonesia to seek closer ties with the
United States, while simultaneously balancing their
desire for regional and national autonomy.45 This represents a window of opportunity for the United States,
which could leverage regional interest in closer ties to
alter and/or expand U.S. forward-based posture in
the theater to more efficiently and effectively promote
U.S. interests across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
Even if political barriers can be overcome and negotiations successfully concluded—as appears to be
the case in the Philippines—the budgetary hurdles
may prove insurmountable in this era of fiscal austerity, given the up-front costs for even rudimentary facilities and then recurring variable and fixed costs associated with forward presence. For instance, the case
of U.S. efforts to create and maintain forward operating sites46 in Romania and Bulgaria sheds light on the
up-front, one-time costs to establish new facilities, as
well as the recurring costs of maintaining such facilities. In this example, the United States spent roughly
$110 million to develop basic training and life support
facilities at existing Romanian and Bulgarian military
bases, which together are capable of hosting an American brigade combat team.47 Since most U.S. forces
use those facilities for exercises and training only on
a periodic or rotational basis, most of the variable recurring costs are funded through exercise and training
programs. Otherwise, the majority of fixed recurring
operating costs are those associated with the so-called
“warm basing” of the site in Romania and the “cold
basing” of the site in Bulgaria, which entails maintaining the facilities between rotational deployments and
managing any requirements generated by ongoing
U.S. humanitarian and civic assistance missions. The
warm/cold basing costs for the sites in Romania and
Bulgaria are roughly $11 million per year.48
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This provides a useful data point for having a sense
of what changes to overseas posture can cost in terms
of both one-time costs and recurring variable and
fixed costs. Of course, costs in Bulgaria and Romania
are very likely to differ from those in East Asia for any
number of reasons, and so a more broadly based study
of overseas presence costs can also help inform any
assessment of one-time and recurring costs, as well
as potential cost mitigation strategies for the United
States. Such a cost study, recently directed by the U.S.
Congress and completed by RAND, was designed to
assess the relative costs and benefits between overseas
permanent and rotational basing on the one hand and
U.S. basing on the other. The RAND study found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the largest single cost driver
in switching from the current posture to an alternative
posture was the cost of new construction.49 In arriving at this conclusion, the study authors assumed that
the “alternative” would involve relocating forces from
outside the United States to facilities inside the United
States, but given the other conclusions reached by
the study authors discussed here it seems reasonable
to assume that the same would apply to a relocation
from one overseas location to another overseas location as well. In terms of cost mitigation strategies, if
the United States were to shift Army forces within the
Indo-Asia-Pacific theater on either a permanent or rotational basis, it would be well-served by concentrating only on those locations with the most advanced
pre-existing life support and training facilities, thereby minimizing the costs of any necessary upgrades.
Regarding whether an alternative rotational presence might be cheaper to maintain than an alternative
permanent presence, somewhat counterintuitively to
those unfamiliar with overseas presence issues, the

22

study found that, “rotational presence is not necessarily less expensive than permanent presence.”50 More
specifically, the study concluded that costs associated
with rotational basing depend on the frequency and
duration of deployments.51 Higher frequency deployments of shorter duration generated more cost, travel
costs in particular, than lower frequency deployments
of longer duration. Hence, if the United States cannot
sustain the costs associated with permanent overseas
presence, a rotational presence of long-duration deployments of many months, or even a year, would
likely prove less expensive, and hence more sustainable from both budgetary and political perspectives,
than short-term deployments of only several weeks or
a few months.
Of the costs associated with long-duration, less
frequent rotational deployments overseas, the congressionally mandated study also found that personnel-related costs, such as food, housing, and special
allowances, were the most significant drivers. The
United States may be able to mitigate some of these
major costs by negotiating for prospective host nations
to assume or at least share housing and food costs. Alternatively, special personnel pay allowances seem an
unlikely candidate for cost-sharing arrangements.
When it comes to negotiations over cost sharing,
the United States probably will not be able to replicate
the direct support arrangements that are in place today with Japan, which has helped to offset by roughly
75 percent the costs of permanently basing U.S. forces
there.52 Nonetheless, even here the new strategic context may prove a benefit to the United States, forcing
a new strategic calculus on countries in the Indo-AsiaPacific region and potentially making them more
amenable to co-funding, defraying, or otherwise off-
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setting the costs of an American military presence. For
example, Germany provides tax and customs relief for
U.S. forces, rent-free property for U.S. basing, thousands of acres of rent-free military training land, and
other contributions that have offset roughly one-third
of U.S. basing costs.53 Further south, Spain has provided similar indirect support that has offset more than
half of U.S. basing costs.54 Similar offsetting, indirect
support arrangements in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region
would go far in reducing U.S. forward presence costs,
while enabling prospective host nations to avoid the
appearance of outsourcing national defense by providing direct payments for U.S. forces.
Finally, in addition to the hurdles described previously, changing the Army’s forward posture may have
the unintended consequence of engendering a sense
of encirclement or alienation among the Chinese. The
roots of China’s strategic distrust of the United States
extend at least to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949—since then, the Chinese have
largely maintained wariness toward America. U.S.
efforts to shift more attention toward the Indo-AsiaPacific region, including as promulgated through the
January 2012 Defense Planning Guidance, appear to
be reinforcing those Chinese sentiments.55 For example, Washington’s strengthening of security ties with
countries such as India and Vietnam—two countries
that have fought border wars with China and that
have not been traditional U.S. allies or even partners
in most instances—have caused many in Beijing to
believe that the United States is bent on containing
China. More broadly, Chinese leaders have come to
view American policies, attitudes, and misperceptions as the chief cause of strategic mistrust between
the two countries.56 Even U.S. efforts to promote
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democracy and human rights are interpreted in Beijing
as nothing more than Trojan horses for the expansion
of American power abroad, often at China’s expense.57
Hence, although the United States has arguably done
more than any other country to contribute to China’s
ongoing modernization, America’s rebalancing risks
feeding China’s sense of encirclement, undermining
regional stability, and decreasing the possibility of cooperation between Beijing and Washington.58
However, Beijing may also come to understand
that a different distribution of the Army presence in
the Pacific theater—or even an increase in that presence—may actually benefit China in two distinct
ways. First, a redistributed American Army forward
presence may act as a pacifier for some of the more aggressive tendencies of U.S. allies in the region. For instance, given recent changes in the security dynamics
of the region, the Philippines announced in mid-2013
that it is spending $1.8 billion to expand and modernize its military aggressively in order to counter Chinese influence.59 A redistributed U.S. Army presence
in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region might better enable
military and security ties between the United States
and its allies, such as the Philippines, thereby expanding American influence and social access and enabling
the United States to better play the role of strategic
pacifier with those allies and partners. This would be
similar in some ways to how the former Soviet Union
came to agree with the U.S. proposal to keep a unified
Germany in NATO following the end of the Cold War.
The Soviet Union came to see that it would be more
secure with a unified Germany under the American
security umbrella rather than a neutral Germany untethered from NATO and free to exercise its power in
a more unilateral fashion.60
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Second, a redistributed U.S. Army presence in
the Pacific may make American allies throughout the
theater more comfortable with a rising China, which,
of course, would benefit Beijing as well. The presence of U.S. Army forces represents a tangible sign of
American commitment on the ground to allied security. Building and maintaining the confidence of U.S.
allies in the steadfastness of the American commitment to their security can benefit China by potentially
mitigating some of the worst fears in the Philippines,
Thailand, Australia, and elsewhere over China’s rise.
This is similar in some ways to how Germany has
supported continued American military presence in
central Europe. Such support from Berlin is not based
simply on the local impact of American dollars being
spent in rural areas of Germany, where U.S. military
facilities tend to be located, but also on a shrewd German understanding of how U.S. troop presence in
Germany helps reassure Poland, the Czech Republic,
France, and others regarding a growing, unified Germany as the most powerful country in Europe. Hence,
in the contemporary Pacific context, it is plausible that
China might actually, although perhaps not overtly,
acquiesce to a changed disposition of Army forces in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.61
Convincing Chinese officials of the potentially
beneficial aspects of a redistributed or increased U.S.
Army presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific will not be
easy—some in Beijing suspect Washington is, in fact,
actively fomenting aggressive behavior on the part of
U.S. allies in the region.62 But there is already some
limited evidence that China might welcome a pacifying role played by the United States vis-à-vis aggressive tendencies of American allies. For instance, an
editorial in China Daily, which tends to reflect official
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opinion in China, noted that with regard to the dispute
with the Philippines over competing island claims:
The joint defense between the United States and the
Philippines . . . will be a favorable factor to stabilize
the situation in the South China Sea as long as the
United States insists on joint defense and opposes to
joint infringement and external expansion by its ally.63

Elsewhere, some Chinese scholars and officials
seem open to the notion of recrafting the great power
relationship between China and the United States.64
Part of that redefinition could include a recognition
within China of the important role the United States
can play in helping to ameliorate security dilemmas
in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Nonetheless, whether Washington can succeed in convincing the government in
Beijing of this—or whether the United States is willing
to take other steps that China believes are necessary
for amelioration of the security dilemma—remains
to be seen. Regardless, whether Washington seeks
to challenge and contain China, or to engage her, or
even to do both, it is worth investigating whether the
U.S. Army can contribute more effectively and more
efficiently to American national security by moving
beyond the Cold War paradigm that has led to an emphasis on the Korean Peninsula.
The Rationale for a Reassessment.
American military forces are forward-based for
several reasons. First and foremost, the United States
bases military forces abroad to defend vital U.S. interests by safeguarding the security of its most important
allies. Examples might include the American presence
in Germany during the Cold War or the American
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presence in South Korea today. Additionally, U.S.
forces may be based overseas to be an ocean closer to
critical lines of communication necessary for American security or that of its allies. The U.S. presence in
Iceland during the Cold War was an example of this,
promoting Washington’s ability to secure and defend
the North Atlantic approaches to both North America
and Europe.
Forward presence also contributes directly to
building and maintaining interoperability with America’s most likely, most capable coalition partners, and
to building and maintaining more limited but no less
important capabilities among other, less capable partners. Examples of this include the U.S. presence in Europe today, which is critical to maintaining interoperability with highly capable allies such as France,
Germany, Israel, Italy, and the United Kingdom, and
to building the capability of militaries in southeastern Europe, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa to
promote stability and security internally and in their
immediate vicinities.
Finally, forward-based U.S. forces provide logistical support to American and allied forces elsewhere.
Examples of this can be seen in elements of the U.S.
presence in Germany and Japan today. During the last
decade or more of war, the American presence in and
around Kaiserslautern in southwestern Germany—
home to Ramstein Air Base and the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center—has been critical to sustaining
operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Likewise, in
the Pacific theater, U.S. Army forces in Japan provide
logistical support to forces in South Korea.
The United States has maintained forward-based
military forces in East Asia since the early-20th century for many of the reasons cited previously. How-
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ever, the origins of today’s U.S. troop presence in East
Asia are found in the broader Cold War era effort to
provide a bulwark against systemic, if not existential,
communist aggression. For the Army, this was most
evident on the Korean Peninsula and in Southeast
Asia, where American Landpower faced significant
tests during the Korean War and the Vietnam War.
On the Korean Peninsula today, the deterrent role
of the U.S. Army remains important. The presence of
over 19,000 Soldiers in South Korea provides a tangible manifestation of U.S. support for South Korea,
which would be important in any immediate response
to a North Korean invasion and would act as a tripwire, compelling an even greater U.S. response in the
event of large scale hostilities initiated by Pyongyang.
Nonetheless, it appears as if the United States is
preparing to take something of a backseat in the defense of the Korean Peninsula. As part of the Strategic
Alliance 2015 agreement signed in July 2010, the South
Korean military is soon to comprise the “supported”
force, with the U.S. military playing a backup or supporting role. The United States will transfer wartime
operational control from the American-led U.S.-South
Korean Combined Forces Command—which will be
disestablished—to the South Korean Joint Chiefs of
Staff by the end of 2015, which will give South Korea
primary responsibility for leading a response to any
North Korean incursion while maintaining the U.S.
commitment to South Korea’s defense. Although this
date may slip somewhat due to concerns over whether and when South Korean forces will be ready, the
underlying plan to transfer control has not been questioned by the United States or South Korea.
Additionally, U.S. forces will consolidate and relocate from bases around Seoul to more centralized loca-
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tions south of the city—this will “improve efficiency,
reduce costs, and enhance force protection by placing
most service members and equipment outside the effective range of North Korean artillery.”65

Figure 3. U.S. Military Plan for Consolidation
and Relocation in South Korea.66
For their part, the South Koreans appear to be committed to the task of assuming wartime operational
control of their own forces, declaring their intent to
strike back at the North if attacked.67 Moreover, U.S.
Forces Korea—the American military command in
South Korea—characterizes the South Korean military as “one of the most progressive and efficient defense organizations in the world.”68 At the same time,
and in part due to demographic challenges, the South
Korean military is in the process of reform designed
to increase the qualitative capabilities of the armed
forces at the expense of quantity—as part of Seoul’s
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Defense Reform Plan 2020, the Active-Duty military
force will be cut by roughly 27 percent from 655,000
troops to roughly 500,000, but the defense budget will
increase so as to modernize equipment and develop a
more professional military force.69
The relocation of U.S. forces from the inter-Korean border to south of Seoul should help increase the
odds of their survivability in the event of any North
Korean attack, as well as reduce the costs of keeping
U.S. forces in South Korea. However, with Americans
no longer on the front lines, literally and figuratively
given the impending South Korean assumption of
wartime operational control, this begs the question of
whether and to what degree the U.S. Army presence
in South Korea deters the North. Although difficult to
assess given the opacity of the North Korean regime,
it would appear at first glance that the deterrent value
of U.S. Army forces relocated south of Seoul and no
longer in operational lead would be more limited than
a generation ago, when U.S. Army forces were more
numerous in South Korea,70 more closely located near
the demilitarized zone, and in the lead role. Nevertheless, upon further examination, it seems that although
U.S. forces may contribute less today to deterrence by
denial, they certainly or at least evidently still contribute to deterrence by punishment.71 This appears to be
the case because despite the reconfigured, relocated
U.S. Army forces in South Korea, the North Koreans
have not initiated a major attack. Certainly, there have
been hundreds, even thousands, of North Korean violations of the armistice since 1953, most of them minor, but the long-feared artillery barrage of Seoul and
subsequent massive armored and infantry invasion
of the South has not occurred. The regime in Pyongyang evidently appears assured that the remaining,
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reconfigured U.S. forces in the South continue to play
at least a “tripwire” role—in other words, the North
Korean regime seems convinced that there would
be an overwhelming American response to major
aggression.
Nonetheless, what remains unclear is what size of
a tripwire is necessary. If U.S. Army forces in South
Korea are to play any role beyond that of tripwire,
the most useful role to play would likely be one the
South Koreans cannot perform themselves or cannot
perform very well. However, and as noted previously,
the South Korean military is perhaps more capable
and full-spectrum than at any time in its history and
likely to become more so, thanks to ongoing reform
efforts. Regardless, and perhaps most importantly for
stability and security in Northeast Asia, any further
reconfiguration of the American presence in South
Korea must be accompanied by overt or explicit signaling, statements, and other actions by the United
States of its resolve to remain steadfast in its alliance
with the South and to punish any major aggression
from the North.
Meanwhile, in Japan, which hosts the second largest concentration of U.S. Army forces in theater—
roughly 2,600 Soldiers—the government in Tokyo appears uninterested in taking up any mantle of global
ambition. Indeed, Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF)
remain hobbled by what some analysts call “anachronistic constraints,”72 which prevent them from engaging more energetically overseas. For this reason,
interoperability between U.S. Army and Japanese
Ground SDF has been limited. Some have blamed this
on a contrast in focus, with the U.S. Army emphasizing wars in Southwest and Central Asia, while Japanese land forces have concentrated on peacekeeping
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operations and disaster relief operations.73 More
broadly though, Japan’s Ground SDF has never emphasized deployability or expeditionary, amphibious
capabilities for reasons largely cultural and constitutional.74
The U.S. Army’s mission in Japan today is to operate port facilities and a series of logistics installations
throughout Honshu and Okinawa. Key units based
there include a combat sustainment and support battalion, an aviation battalion consisting of UH-60 helicopters and UC-35 fixed-wing aircraft, a signal battalion, an ordnance battalion, and a military police
detachment. Meanwhile, 15,300 Marines, 12,700 Airmen, and 3,400 Sailors are also based in Japan.75 If the
U.S. Army mission in South Korea were modified and
the resulting forward presence there re-vamped in accordance with the modified mission, the Army may
find decreasing utility for its forces in Japan and might
consider turning over residual logistical functions to
the Navy, which has a far larger presence in Japan and
some of the very same logistical capabilities there.76
What Might a Reconfigured Army Presence
in Asia Look Like?
If the U.S. Army’s mission in Northeast Asia were
modified so as to enable the Army to achieve its objectives with fewer Soldiers in both South Korea and
Japan, it is conceivable that the Army could make a
greater contribution to theater-wide U.S. national
military and national security objectives.77 It is even
conceivable that such a contribution might be made
more efficiently and more effectively than is presently
the case.
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The strategy of the USARPAC—the Army component command within the larger USPACOM—
centers on achieving five related objectives across
the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.78 The first of these—the
highest priority—centers on assuring treaty allies of
the steadfastness of the U.S. defense commitment
and on maintaining and expanding operational and
tactical interoperability. Of the six treaty allies in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific theater, South Korea is arguably the
only one where the physical presence of U.S. Army
Soldiers makes a tangible, necessary difference in the
deterrence of aggression against that treaty ally. None
of the others—Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and
Thailand—face the same type of threat for which a U.S.
Army physical presence forms a necessary policy tool
in terms of “assurance,” although as argued later in
this monograph, the imperative to maintain interoperability for the most complex military operations
across the region and beyond with a country such as
Australia may form the basis for a reconsideration of
this conventional wisdom.
Whether the U.S. Army presence in South Korea—
the tripwire that enables deterrence by punishment—
needs to remain as high as 19,000 Soldiers while still
assuring Seoul and South Korea’s neighbors of the
American commitment is open to debate. Arguably,
that presence could be reduced to center on air and
missile defense units and military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance units—two functional areas
that even the increasingly capable South Korean military would likely garner great value from continuing
to host and interact with—while still providing South
Korea with treaty-based assurance and the ability to
conduct bilateral exercises and training events. Additionally, shifting U.S. Army resources from South Ko-
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rea and Japan to elsewhere would likely increase their
operational resilience by dispersing them around the
Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. At present, most of the U.S.
Army’s “eggs” are in two baskets, South Korea and
Japan, arguably the highest threat zones throughout
the entire theater. This places them at great risk of
strategic failure in the face of increasing threats from
precision-guided munitions. Finally, a reduction in
the Army presence in South Korea would have the
added benefit of reducing administrative and logistical costs to the Army. Because most U.S. troops serve
in South Korea on 1-year tours of duty, unaccompanied by family members or other dependents, roughly
600 to 700 U.S. servicemen and servicewomen arrive
or leave South Korea each month.79 Indeed, the current commander of U.S. Forces Korea, General James
Thurman, has asked the Army and other U.S. military
services to investigate how they might collectively
mitigate the negative effects created by the high turnover rate.80
If the number of U.S. Soldiers in South Korea were
reduced—as well as the number of U.S. Soldiers in
Japan—and repositioned elsewhere in the theater on
a permanent or long-duration rotational basis, those
U.S. forces could be utilized to achieve USARPAC’s
theater-wide objectives far more cheaply than flying
in personnel and equipment from Hawaii, Alaska, or
the continental United States. After “assure,” the next
highest priority for USARPAC is to promote the ability of key partners to assume greater responsibility for
security and stability in their region and beyond. This
essentially entails developing among key partners
their ability to lead and participate in multinational
crisis response operations across the range of military
operations, with or without U.S. forces.
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If such operations are to occur in conjunction with
U.S. forces, then interoperability is critical—namely,
the ability of allied or partner military forces and those
of the United States to operate side by side or embedded with each other in military operations. America’s
most important ally in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region in
this regard is Australia, with good reason. In repeated
instances, the Australian government has proven itself willing and able to deploy and sustain Australian
military forces for operations with U.S. forces. Afghanistan provided the most recent evidence of this,
and there is no reason to think this will change any
time soon, despite a period of budget austerity on both
sides of the Pacific.81 The commonality of world outlook; the shared values; and the professional, capable,
expeditionary nature of the Australian military make
Australia one of America’s most likely, most capable
future coalition partners.82
Most recently, U.S. Army and Australian forces
worked together in Uruzghan province in Afghanistan, building interoperability on the ground in the
process. With the ISAF mission in Afghanistan winding down over the next 1 1/2 years and with Australian forces poised to end their mission in Afghanistan
by late-2013, there is no Army presence in Australia
today or planned for tomorrow that might be used to
maintain interoperability with this critical ally. Moreover, the ABCA program—designed to promote interoperability between the armies of America, Britain,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—has languished
in recent years due to a lack of available forces, funding cuts, and episodic senior-level attention within the
Army.83 When U.S. Army forces are sent to exercise
with Australian counterparts—for instance, as part of
the Talisman Saber exercise series, held for 3 weeks
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every other year—they are typically deployed at significant cost from the United States, particularly the
25th Infantry Division based in both Hawaii and Alaska, as well as Army units based in Washington State.
Although the United States lacks the same kind of
strategic interoperability imperative with India that it
has with Australia, it remains nonetheless important
to Washington to promote the ability of India to exercise regional, if not global, leadership in promoting
security and stability. Deepening defense and security
cooperation with India is therefore of critical importance to Washington, particularly as ISAF and the large
American presence in Central Asia comes to an end.84
In fact, former Secretary of Defense Panetta called defense cooperation with India “a lynchpin” of the U.S.
strategy to rebalance to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.85
To this end, the U.S. Army has responded by intensifying its relationship with the Indian Army, focusing
specifically on building capabilities for peacekeeping
operations. In 2004, the two armies began conducting
an annual training event dubbed “Yudh Abhyas,” the
first such engagements since 1962. In 2009, the series
expanded from what were relatively small annual
exchanges focused on command post activities—that
year, roughly 250 U.S. Soldiers based in Hawaii traveled to India, with 17 Stryker vehicles, to take part in
live-fire and field training exercises over 2 1/2 weeks.
In 2010, roughly 150 Indian soldiers traveled to Joint
Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska for 2 weeks
to participate in Yudh Abhyas 2010. In March 2012,
170 U.S. Soldiers based in Hawaii, Alaska, and Japan
traveled to an Indian Army training area in Rajasthan
for 2 weeks to conduct Yudh Abhyas 2011-12, a livefire event and a field training exercise built around a
peacekeeping operation scenario. The 2011-12 itera-
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tion was noteworthy for the deployment of three U.S.
tanks to India to participate in the event. In May 2013,
roughly 200 Indian soldiers traveled to Ft. Bragg, NC,
to participate in Yudh Abhyas 2013 for 2 weeks, which
included a combined airborne operation.
If some of the U.S. Army forces in South Korea and
Japan were repositioned closer to Southeast Asia, security cooperation events designed to maintain strategic, operational, and tactical interoperability with the
Australian Army for the full range of military operations and to build operational and tactical interoperability with the Indian Army for a more limited set of
operations, including peacekeeping, potentially could
be executed more easily, cheaply, and frequently—
transportation costs alone would be cut at least in
half, compared to sending forces from the 50 states to
participate in such events.86 At the same time, those
U.S. Army forces could more easily and cheaply also
accomplish the third USARPAC objective—enhancing critical capabilities among partners so that those
partners can address internal security challenges and
participate in regional peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance, and disaster relief operations.
Enhancing the capabilities of partner militaries in
this way is an objective pursued by USARPAC across
the entire Indo-Asia-Pacific region, including China
specifically. Obviously, some countries are more
willing than others to participate in the kinds of security cooperation events that help to achieve these
objectives, such as small-scale bilateral exercises and
subject matter expert exchanges. Nevertheless, as evidenced by the cost data discussed earlier in this monograph, the cost of engaging willing partners to achieve
U.S. objectives would likely be lower if the Army had
forward-based forces repositioned closer to Southeast
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Asia, as well as those remaining in Northeast Asia,
vice deploying forces from Hawaii, Alaska, or the continental United States.
Repositioning U.S. Army forces toward Southeast
Asia would also enable USARPAC to achieve its fourth
and fifth priorities more effectively in the Indo-AsiaPacific theater—opening new relationships and sustaining traditional, less intensive relationships—but
the efficiency gains would likely be more limited than
those described previously. These last two objectives
are pursued largely through senior-leader engagements and small group exchanges, usually involving
limited numbers of personnel and little to no military
equipment.
Nonetheless, it seems that there may indeed be efficiencies to be gained and costs to be reduced through
a repositioning of some U.S. Army forces toward
Southeast Asia. When it comes to specific locations
where U.S. Army forces might be relocated to from
South Korea and/or Japan, or whether such a repositioned forward presence might be permanent or rotational, the options depend first on the objectives to be
achieved. For instance, the Army’s experience both in
Europe and South Korea has shown that, in order to
maintain ground forces strategic, operational, and tactical interoperability across the full range of military
operations, permanent forward presence is preferable
to rotational presence.87
Given Australia’s role as the closest, most interoperable, most capable ally in the theater today and the
fact that Australia is likely to remain America’s most
capable, most likely future coalition partner, it seems
logical to consider a permanent U.S. Army presence
there, or at least long-duration rotational deployments. As noted previously, the Marines have already
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begun short-term rotational deployments to an Australian military training facility near Darwin, on the
northern coast of Australia. The U.S. Army needs to be
interoperable with the Australians, too, particularly as
the Marine Corps returns from essentially functioning
as America’s second land force in Iraq and Afghanistan to being the light, forced-entry military component, which is their comparative advantage. So far,
public opinion surveys in Australia reveal growing
support for the Marines’ rotational presence—in 2011,
55 percent of Australians were either strongly in favor
or somewhat in favor of the U.S. presence in Darwin,
whereas in 2013, that figure had risen to 61 percent.88
A mid-sized city of 130,000 people with a history
of hosting military service members, Darwin represents a potential location for an initially small presence of U.S. Soldiers—ideally permanent, but perhaps
consisting of medium- to longer-term rotational deployments at first. Such a presence could be usefully
modeled on the Bulgaria/Romania example cited earlier, which would focus on extensive interoperability
training with nearby Australian forces but also include
shorter-duration training and exercise deployments
from the warm base in Australia to Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and
elsewhere. With an English-speaking population and
a Western culture, Australia provides a potentially attractive host nation environment, as the U.S. Marine
Corps is now learning. The Australian Army’s Robertson Barracks—20 minutes’ drive from the center of
Darwin—plays host to a light-armored brigade, which
trains at the Bradshaw Field Training Area, roughly
600 kilometers southwest. The Bradshaw Field Training Area is a 2.1 million acre training site, which is
the largest in Australia and roughly three times the
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size of the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA.
Bradshaw Field includes a joint and combined Australian-U.S. training center, as well as an airstrip capable of handling C-17 Globemasters. However, other
infrastructure at Bradshaw Field is quite limited, and
excessive precipitation during the rainy season makes
it difficult to fully utilize the training area from lateNovember until early-April.
Whether a cost-sharing agreement could be
reached with Australia for a permanent or long-duration rotational presence at Robertson Barracks or
Bradshaw Field, of course, remains to be seen. However, with an arrangement similar to what U.S. forces
enjoy in Germany—including no-cost lease of land, no
taxes, no customs duties, and cost-free access to existing military training grounds—the Australian government thereby could indirectly carry roughly 30 percent of the cost of basing U.S. Soldiers there. From the
U.S. Army’s perspective, the roughly $21 million that
is spent on theater security cooperation events across
the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater every year—the vast majority of which is spent on transportation of personnel
and equipment participating in roughly 14 exercises
annually—could be spread among many more events
if the transportation-related cost of participation were
cut by 50-75 percent.
A second possible location for a more robust U.S.
Army presence may be the Philippines. At present,
though, media reports indicate the Filipino government has agreed only to a rotational presence of U.S.
ships, aircraft, and troops for training events, exercises, and disaster and relief operations, with the potential of pre-positioning military equipment as well.89
In any case, an initial rotational presence of increasingly longer durations may provide a starting point
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for consideration of other, varied U.S. Army forward
presence options in the longer-term.90
Given its central location in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
region, relative at least to Australia and certainly to
South Korea, transportation costs associated with a
robust security cooperation program—increasingly
critical to American national security as described in
the strategic context section previously—would most
likely be far less than they are today. Moreover, response times to potential crisis locations across the
increasingly critical lines of communication from the
Indian Ocean to the Pacific would be shorter. Additionally, space for an increased American presence—
whether permanent or rotational—exists in the form
of what remains of the shuttered Subic Bay naval facility and Clark Air Base, which were the largest overseas American military facilities in the world during
the Cold War period. Given the pressure Chinese actions in the South China Sea are generating in Manila,
the government there may be amenable to some costsharing arrangement in what has been described as a
“renaissance” period in U.S.-Filipino relations.91
A third potential location for an increased Army
presence in Southeast Asia may be Thailand. The
U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield is currently the
only facility in Southeast Asia capable of supporting
large-scale logistical operations.92 Although the United States maintains significant military, intelligence,
and law enforcement ties with Thailand, it is unclear
whether the government in Bangkok today has the
same strategic outlook and interests as the United
States. Hence, its “reliability as a partner and its ability to be a regional leader” are uncertain.”93 More specifically, the 2006 military coup has complicated U.S.
relations with Thailand, and the country is therefore
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a less attractive partner for a permanent or even rotational U.S. Army presence.94
Regardless of the specific location—Thailand, the
Philippines, Australia, or elsewhere—Washington
would need to carefully manage the presence, activities, and numbers of permanent or rotationally deployed U.S. Army forces. American military activities
overtly aimed against China or Chinese interests would
likely magnify the sense among potential host nations
that they are choosing between the United States and
China, a position that is anathema for most countries
of the region. Clear benefits to local populations—for
example, in terms of contracts with local businesses,
employment of local nationals, and engagement with
and support for local civic organizations—would go
far in solidifying positive perceptions of any new
American military presence in Southeast Asia.
Conclusion.
In a period of declining defense budgets and
decreasing military end strength, the U.S. military
cannot afford to continue to add tasks to its already
lengthy to-do list. Likewise, “doing more with less” is
a recipe for strategic and tactical failure. In the specific
context of America’s rebalance to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, characterized previously as an unfolding
evolution in American security policy, it appears increasingly evident that, to achieve all of its objectives,
the United States must reexamine long-held assumptions and policy choices. Without doing so, the costs
of maintaining increased outreach to and engagement
with Indo-Asia-Pacific countries outside of Northeast
Asia will soon become unsustainable. The tyranny of
distance in the Pacific theater and the costs associated
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with sending a company of Soldiers from Hawaii,
Alaska, or Washington State to Australia make this
point all the more stark for the land-based U.S. Army.
The Army’s enduring presence in Northeast Asia
appears to be one of those long-held policy choices
ripe for a reassessment. The preceding pages do not
suggest completely abandoning a forward presence in
Northeast Asia—to the contrary, deterrence through
punishment remains a key, vital element in U.S. policy
toward the erratic regime in Pyongyang, made tangible by the presence of American boots on the ground
in South Korea. Nonetheless, it seems plausible that a
reconfigured U.S. Army presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region would enable the United States to achieve
its objectives in the theater more effectively and more
efficiently, reducing costs to the military, while simultaneously expanding the array of objectives the
forward-based forces can help to achieve.
Specifically, by reorienting some of its existing forward presence from Northeast Asia toward Southeast
Asia, the U.S. Army could make its efforts at promoting, enhancing, opening, and sustaining key relationships cheaper and easier to fulfill. At the same time,
the U.S. Army could continue to play its critical role
in assuring treaty allies and partners throughout the
entire theater of the steadfastness of America’s commitments.
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